FROM: THE BOEING COMPANY TO: MOM [MESSAGE NUMBER:MOM-> > MOM-09-0063- 01B] 04-Mar-2009 05:29:01 AM US PACIFIC TIME Multi> > Operator Message This message is sent to all> > 737-100,-200, -300,-400, -500,-600, -700,-800, -900,-BBJ customers and> > to respective Boeing Field Service bases, Regional Directors, the> > Air Transport Association, International Air Transport Association,> > and Airline Resident Representatives. SERVICE REQUEST ID:> > 1-1228079803 ACCOUNT: Boeing Correspondence (MOM) DUE DATE: 10-> > Mar-2009 PRODUCT TYPE: Airplane PRODUCT LINE: 737 PRODUCT:> > 737-100,-200, -300,-400, -500,-600, -700,-800, -900,-BBJ ATA: 3400-00> > SUBJECT: 737-800 TC-JGE Accident at Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam – 25> > February 2009 REFERENCES: /A/ 1-1222489391 Dated 25 February 2009> > Reference /A/ provides Boeing’s previous fleet communication on the> > subject event.> > The US NTSB, FAA, Boeing, the Turkish DGCA, the operator, the UK> > AAIB, and the French BEA continue to actively support the Dutch> > Safety Board’s (DSB) investigation of this accident. The DSB has> > released a statement on the progress of the investigation and has> > approved the release of the following information. While the complex> > investigation is just beginning, certain facts have emerged from> > work completed thus far: – To date, no evidence has been found of> > bird strike, engine or airframe icing, wake turbulence or windshear.> > – There was adequate fuel on board the airplane during the entire> > flight. – Both engines responded normally to throttle inputs during> > the entire flight. – The airplane responded normally to flight> > control inputs throughout the flight. The Digital Flight Data> > Recorder (DFDR) data indicates that the crew was using autopilot B> > and the autothrottle for an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach> > to runway 18R at Amsterdam Schiphol airport. During the approach,> > the right Low Range Radio Altimeter (LRRA) was providing accurate> > data and the left LRRA was providing an erroneous reading of -7 to> > -8 feet. When descending through approximately 2000 feet the> > autothrottle, which uses the left radio altimeter data, transitioned> > to landing flare mode and retarded the throttles to the idle stop.> > The throttles remained at the idle stop for approximately 100> > seconds during which time the airspeed decreased to approximately 40> > knots below the selected approach speed. The two LRRA systems> > provide height above ground readings to several aircraft systems> > including the instrument displays, autothrottle, autopilots and> > configuration/ ground proximity warning. If one LRRA provides> > erroneous altitude readings, typical flight deck effects, which> > require flight crew intervention whether or not accompanied by an> > LRRA fault flag, include: – Large differences between displayed> > radio altitudes, including radio altitude readings of -8 feet in> > flight. – Inability to engage both autopilots in dual channel APP> > (Approach) mode – Unexpected removal of the Flight Director Command> > Bars during approach – Unexpected Configuration Warnings during> > approach, go-around and initial climb after takeoff – Premature FMA> > (Flight Mode Annunciation) indicating autothrottle RETARD mode> > during approach phase with the airplane above 27 feet AGL. There> > will also be corresponding throttle movement towards the idle stop.> > Additionally, the FMA will continue to indicate RETARD after the> > throttles have reached the idle stop Boeing Recommended Action -> > Boeing recommends operators inform flight crews of the above> > investigation details and the DSB interim report when it is> > released. In addition, crews should be reminded to carefully monitor> > primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.) and the FMA for> > autoflight modes. More information can be found in the Boeing 737> > Flight Crew Training Manual and Flight Crew Operations Manual.> > Operators who experience any of the flight deck effects described> > above should consult the troubleshooting instructions contained in> > the 737 Airplane Maintenance Manual. Further, 737-NG operators may> > wish to review 737NG-FTD-34- 09001 which provides information> > specific for the 737-NG installation. Initial investigations suggest> > that a similar sequence of events and flight deck indications are> > theoretically possible on the 737-100/-200/ -300/-400/ -500.> > Consequently the above recommendations also apply to earlier 737> > models.> >ilgilenenler olabilir diyeboeing’in bultenini size de gonderiyorum.
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FROM: THE BOEING COMPANY TO: MOM [MESSAGE NUMBER:MOM-> > MOM-09-0063- 01B] 04-Mar-2009 05:29:01 AM US PACIFIC TIME Multi> > Operator Message This message is sent to all> > 737-100,-200, -300,-400, -500,-600, -700,-800, -900,-BBJ customers and> > to respective Boeing Field Service bases, Regional Directors, the> > Air Transport Association, International Air Transport Association,> > and Airline Resident Representatives. SERVICE REQUEST ID:> > 1-1228079803 ACCOUNT: Boeing Correspondence (MOM) DUE DATE: 10-> > Mar-2009 PRODUCT TYPE: Airplane PRODUCT LINE: 737 PRODUCT:> > 737-100,-200, -300,-400, -500,-600, -700,-800, -900,-BBJ ATA: 3400-00> > SUBJECT: 737-800 TC-JGE Accident at Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam – 25> > February 2009 REFERENCES: /A/ 1-1222489391 Dated 25 February 2009> > Reference /A/ provides Boeing’s previous fleet communication on the> > subject event.> > The US NTSB, FAA, Boeing, the Turkish DGCA, the operator, the UK> > AAIB, and the French BEA continue to actively support the Dutch> > Safety Board’s (DSB) investigation of this accident. The DSB has> > released a statement on the progress of the investigation and has> > approved the release of the following information. While the complex> > investigation is just beginning, certain facts have emerged from> > work completed thus far: – To date, no evidence has been found of> > bird strike, engine or airframe icing, wake turbulence or windshear.> > – There was adequate fuel on board the airplane during the entire> > flight. – Both engines responded normally to throttle inputs during> > the entire flight. – The airplane responded normally to flight> > control inputs throughout the flight. The Digital Flight Data> > Recorder (DFDR) data indicates that the crew was using autopilot B> > and the autothrottle for an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach> > to runway 18R at Amsterdam Schiphol airport. During the approach,> > the right Low Range Radio Altimeter (LRRA) was providing accurate> > data and the left LRRA was providing an erroneous reading of -7 to> > -8 feet. When descending through approximately 2000 feet the> > autothrottle, which uses the left radio altimeter data, transitioned> > to landing flare mode and retarded the throttles to the idle stop.> > The throttles remained at the idle stop for approximately 100> > seconds during which time the airspeed decreased to approximately 40> > knots below the selected approach speed. The two LRRA systems> > provide height above ground readings to several aircraft systems> > including the instrument displays, autothrottle, autopilots and> > configuration/ ground proximity warning. If one LRRA provides> > erroneous altitude readings, typical flight deck effects, which> > require flight crew intervention whether or not accompanied by an> > LRRA fault flag, include: – Large differences between displayed> > radio altitudes, including radio altitude readings of -8 feet in> > flight. – Inability to engage both autopilots in dual channel APP> > (Approach) mode – Unexpected removal of the Flight Director Command> > Bars during approach – Unexpected Configuration Warnings during> > approach, go-around and initial climb after takeoff – Premature FMA> > (Flight Mode Annunciation) indicating autothrottle RETARD mode> > during approach phase with the airplane above 27 feet AGL. There> > will also be corresponding throttle movement towards the idle stop.> > Additionally, the FMA will continue to indicate RETARD after the> > throttles have reached the idle stop Boeing Recommended Action -> > Boeing recommends operators inform flight crews of the above> > investigation details and the DSB interim report when it is> > released. In addition, crews should be reminded to carefully monitor> > primary flight instruments (airspeed, attitude etc.) and the FMA for> > autoflight modes. More information can be found in the Boeing 737> > Flight Crew Training Manual and Flight Crew Operations Manual.> > Operators who experience any of the flight deck effects described> > above should consult the troubleshooting instructions contained in> > the 737 Airplane Maintenance Manual. Further, 737-NG operators may> > wish to review 737NG-FTD-34- 09001 which provides information> > specific for the 737-NG installation. Initial investigations suggest> > that a similar sequence of events and flight deck indications are> > theoretically possible on the 737-100/-200/ -300/-400/ -500.> > Consequently the above recommendations also apply to earlier 737> > models.> >ilgilenenler olabilir diyeboeing’in bultenini size de gonderiyorum.